Is the raging battle for Basra a good thing for the U.S. interests in Iraq? Or is it  a bad thing for the U.S. national interest in getting its troops out of a relatively stable Iraq as quickly as possible? It’s too soon to know, but Americans can be forgiven if they feel more confused after listening to the Orwellian statements emanating from their government.

Until last week, the Bush administration was insisting that the stunning (and real) drop in violence following last summer’s U.S. troop surge was beginning to foster Iraqi political reconciliation.

Last week, as U.S. forces were drawn into heated battles in Baghdad and launched artillery strikes into Basra, the president asserted that the resumption of full-scale warfare between the Shiite-led government and its chief Shiite rivals is a positive development, as it means that the government, led by the unpopular Prime Minister Nouri Maliki, is now strong enough to be able to crack down on the criminal elements in Basra.

So, if there is no fighting in Iraq, that’s proof that the surge is working and U.S. troops should stay to consolidate their gains. And if there is what looks a great deal like the resumption of an intra-ethnic civil war over money, power and control of territory in Baghdad as well as in Basra, then that’s proof that the surge worked, but U.S. troops should stay because there’s more to be done. Got it?

The Democratic-controlled Congress is unlikely to buy this particular piece of spin, however expertly finessed by the U.S. commander in Iraq, Gen. David H. Petraeus, and the U.S. ambassador, Ryan Crocker. Petraeus and Crocker are scheduled to testify on April 8 and 9. Oddly, April 8 is the new deadline set by Maliki for the “criminal gangs” in Basra to turn over their “heavy and medium-sized weapons” in exchange for unspecified cash rewards. (Maliki had initially given them three days to hand over the weapons, but extended it as the Iraqi military’s effort to retake Basra flounded amid heavier-than-expected opposition.)

Congress should not wait until April 8 to begin demanding answers to the many questions raised by this bloody new turn of events. First, is it true that Maliki did not give his U.S. ally advance notice that he intended to invade Basra? If not, why not?

There are many reasons why Maliki needed to get Basra back under control. Its vital port has in fact has been under gangland management for years. British forces failed spectacularly in attempts to bring law and order to the waterfront, or to pacify the rival militias fighting turf wars over Basra. And Maliki’s political competitors in the southern Shiite belt appeared poised to do well, if not sweep, the provincial elections slated for October.

Whether Maliki sandbagged the United States into helping him make war on Basra now is an open question. President Bush said Friday he was not sure why Maliki chose this moment to try to crush the Madhi Army. That militia is controlled by Maliki’s rival, the anti-American cleric Moqtada Sadr, who had been abiding by a cease-fire he declared seven months ago. Maliki’s foes say he’s using the Americans to help him wipe out his political competitors ahead of the elections. Whether or not there is any truth to such a charge, this view held by the rival Shiites now under U.S. bombardment will make Washington seem even less credible as a honest broker for Iraqi political reconcilation. Even if Maliki succeeds in cleaning up Basra with a minimum of bloodshed, the renewed internecine violence highlights the importance of planning a careful, strategic U.S. military disengagement from Iraq.